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Abstract
In this work we present a Global Emission Game with N asymmet-
ric players, in which the pay-off of cooperators is affected by a Social
Externalities, that we assume to be a positive function. We refer to the
notion of self-enforcing agreements to study the stability of the coali-
tion and we assume that the N players are divided in two homogeneous
groups, developed and developing countries. Moreover, the externali-
ties doesn’t depend on emissions, but only on the number of players in
coalition. So, it has no effects on the choice of optimal emissions, but
only on the stability of the coalition.
Keywords: Global Emission Games, self-enforcing agreements, Social Ex-
ternalities, asymmetric players
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1 Introduction
Environmental issues are a major theme for current politicians. Most of these
issues, like climate change, acid rain or ozone depletion, are related to trans-
boundary pollution and for that require global policies. There have been many
occasions in which sovereign countries met to discuss the problems and find
solutions. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(1987) and the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of Green House Gases (1997)
are just the main examples of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs).
Obviously, the problem deals with several economic issues. If we see to coali-
tion formation process, we lie within the class of coordination problems. A
natural approach to this class of problems is the Game Theory. So, in the
last two decades extensive literature has been developed, since the works of
Carraro and Siniscalco [7] and Barrett [2].
Cooperative games stream assumes that a coalition is formed and the main fo-
cus is on how to divide the surplus of cooperation between players who join the
agreement. On the other side, non-cooperative games stream starts from the
consideration that there is no supranational authority that can force players
to cooperate, so the central point here is how the coalition formation process
works, assuming that each player looks at his interest. Since in this case we
have the well-known problem of free-riding, then we need some conditions that
guarantee the stability of the coalition. We deal with the latter approach and
we model a global emission game (see [11]). As usual, we consider a two-stage
game: the first stage is the membership game, in which players make the choice
about the entrance in the coalition, then we have the emission game, in which
cooperators maximize the joint welfare, while defectors choice emissions by
their own. For that, we look for a partial cooperative equilibrium ([19]; [20];
[8]; [3]). Naturally, the membership game is a metagame, because each player,
choosing whether join or not in coalition, anticipates the choice of the other
players and the relative outcomes in terms of emission levels. So, we first solve
the maximization problems of the emission game and then we use the opti-
mal emission to approach the membership game. To find a stable coalition,
we need to refer to the self-enforcing stability conditions like in [9]. Briefly
speaking, we say that a coalition of k players is stable if no one inside has an
incentive to withdraw (internal stability) and no one outside has an incentive
to join (external stability).
There are two issues on which we focus. First of all, we assume some degree
of asymmetry between players, despite most of the literature assumes a world
with symmetric countries. This choice is based on some practical considera-
tions, the most important of which is the need to involve developing countries
in emissions’ reduction process. On the one hand, we have that developing
countries have no responsibility for the actual level of pollution, moreover
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other economic issues are central in their economic agenda, like to increase the
wealth per capita, to build infrastructure, to increase the level of instruction,
etc. So, environment is a “luxury” good. On the other side, in the list of de-
veloping countries we have some like China, India, Brazil or South Africa that
give a significant contribution to the increment of pollution. In this sense, we
need to design agreements that can involve this kind of players in environment
protection policies. In our model, we first consider a world with N asymmetric
countries and we solve the emission game. To approach the membership game,
we assume that players are divided into two homogeneous groups: developed
and developing countries.
The second issue is that if we want a stable and large coalition, if possible
the grand coalition, we need to create some mechanisms that incentive play-
ers to cooperate, or that disincentive players to not cooperate. In literature,
several proposals to design a self-enforcing agreement, have been presented.
For example, we have models based on IEAs supported by trigger strategies
(see e.g., [2]; [1]), that’s to say that if a player in coalition defects, the other
cooperators can punish him. Or, the gain from cooperation can be used, via
transfer scheme (see e.g., [14]; [23]), to enlarge a stable coalition. Finally, we
have the way known as issue linkage (see e.g., [18]; [4]; [16]), that tries to
make the agreement economically advantageous linking the IEAs to another
agreement, that could be R&D, or trade or another economic issue.
We explore another mechanism, that is the Social Externalities introduced in
[6]. Our motivation is based on the consideration that an IEA should be seen
within a network of relations between sovereign countries. For this reason we
think that it is not credible that someone has the power to punish a country
like China or has the will to transfer a certain amount to convince it to reduce
its emissions.
What we say is that when players have to take the choice of joining the agree-
ment, they consider all possible earnings due to the relationship that they
build participating to the agreement. The objective of this work is to extend
the framework of Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani [6], considering a world with
asymmetric countries.
In Section 2 we present the model and its functional forms, introducing the
externalities and the optimization problems. In Section 3 we characterize the
optimal emissions and the consequent optimal welfares. In Section 4 we dis-
cuss about the stability conditions, we present some conditions for which a
stable coalition exists and we present some numerical simulations. Section 5
concludes.
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2 The Model
In this section we present the model. We consider a world with N asymmetric
countries that correspond to our set of players I, where I = {1, ..., N}. We
make some commonly assumptions about the functional forms of the model.
We denote with fi(ei) the production function of player i, where ei ≥ 0 de-
scribes the emissions of the player. The idea behind is that there is a direct
correlation between production and pollution1. MoreoverDi(E) is the damage-
cost function for player i, where E is the global emission, E =
∑N
p=1 ep. So,
for each player i, we consider
fi(ei) =δi
(
αiei − 1
2
e2i
)
,
Di(E) =βi
( N∑
i=1
ei
)
,
where ei is the emission of player i, and the parameters αi, βi (vulnerability
to environmental damage) and δi (shifting marginal benefits) are strictly pos-
itive. We consider a quadratic production function that is a classic choice in
literature, and a linear damage-cost function, that is not uncommon in liter-
ature (see e.g., [15]; [5]; [23]) and supported by some empirical estimations
(see [17]). Nevertheless, the differences between a linear damage-cost function
and a more realistic quadratic function (see e.g., [22]; [13]; [21]) are almost all
quantitative, but not qualitative.
We assume that the grand coalition is the social optimum, so we look for
a mechanism that can involve in emission reduction process as many countries
as possible. For this reason we introduce in the model the concept of Social
Externalities (see [6]). We suppose that when countries decide to join in a
coalition, their welfare is affected by an extra-profit that is uncorrelated with
the optimization problem, but depends only on the number of cooperators.
The idea behind is that countries could be motivated to sign an environmental
agreement, although their primary interest is not the environment. Classical
example is Russia, that ratified the Kyoto protocol with the hope to have more
consideration when its entry in World Trade Organization (WTO) would have
been voted. So, we assume that discuss about environment is an occasion to
create a link between countries and this link can bring mutual benefit in many
economic fields that do not deal with environment protection. It follows that
the larger the network, the greater the externalities.
1Mathematically, we assume that emissions are by-product of industrial activities xi,
that’s to say ei = g(xi). If we take g(·) as a smooth function, we can invert it and write
xi = g
−1(ei) := fi(ei).
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From a mathematical point of view, we add a strictly positive function to the
cooperators’ welfare, and we assume that this function in not related to the
emissions. So, we have that the externalities has effects on the stability of the
coalition, but not on the choice of optimal emissions. Its immateriality makes
the concept of Social Externalities vague, because potentially within it we have
all the possible relations that countries could establish. But we think that the
loss of descriptive power (e.g., respect the idea of issue linkage) is acceptable,
considering the great flexibility that we gain with this approach. We present
in the following the functional forms of the model by choosing the production,
the damage-cost and the externality functions.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that the first k players in the set I join
the coalition, and maximize the joint welfare, while the remaining (N − k)
players act by their own, maximizing their single welfare. So, we have the
optimization problem, for each player j not in coalition, as follows:
max
ej
wNCj = max
ej
{
δj
(
αjej − 1
2
e2j
)
− βj
( N∑
i=1
ei
)}
. (1)
For the coalition, we have a joint welfare maximization and moreover we
hypothesize that a Social Externalities, related to the number of players in
coalition only, affects the welfare. So the optimization problem is:
max
e1...ek
k∑
i=1
wCi = max
e1...ek
k∑
i=1
[
δi
(
αiei − 1
2
e2i
)
− βi
( k∑
h=1
eh +
N∑
h=k+1
eh
)
+ si
]
, (2)
where the parameter si > 0 represent the Social Externalities.
3 Emission Solutions and Welfares
In order to find the optimal emissions for the defectors, we solve the first order
conditions of the problem (1). Deriving respect ej and imposing the result
equal to zero, we have
∂wNCj
∂ej
= αjδj − δjej − βj = 0.
Rearranging, we can find the expression for non-cooperative emissions, as fol-
lows
eNCj = αj −
βj
δj
. (3)
In a similar way, we calculate the partial derivative of the problem (2), with
respect to ei, where i = 1, . . . , k, and find the emission of every player in
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coalition by solving the k-dimensional system obtained by imposing that all
the derivatives to be equal to zero
α1δ1 − δ1e1 −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0,
...
αiδi − δiei −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0,
...
αkδk − δkek −
∑k
h=1 βh = 0.
Then the emission for each player i in coalition is:
eCi = αi −
1
δi
k∑
h=1
βh. (4)
To find the welfares of cooperative and non-cooperative players, we have to
compute wi(e
C
1 , . . . , e
C
k , e
NC
k+1, . . . , e
NC
N ) for any i ∈ I, that we denote by wCi (k)
for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and by wNCj (k) for j ∈ {k + 1, .., N}
wCi (k) = δi
[
αi
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)
− 1
2
(
αi − 1δi
∑k
h=1 βh
)2]
+
−βi
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
+
+
∑k
h=1 sh,
wNCj (k) = δj
[
αj
(
αj − βjδj
)
− 1
2
(
αj − βjδj
)2]
+
−βj
[∑k
p=1
(
αp − 1δp
∑k
h=1 βh
)
+
∑N
p=k+1
(
αp − βpδp
)]
,
in which i is a cooperative player, j is a defector and the coalition consists of
k players.
Remark 3.1 We want to highlight that this game is a positive externalities
and superadditive game. Positive externalities says that ∀i ∈ C and ∀j ∈ NC,
then wj(C) ≥ wj(C\i). Moreover, there exists at least a player z ∈ NC, such
that wz(C) > wz(C\i). This is clearly true, because if a player withdraws from
the coalition the emissions of non-cooperator remain the same, but the damage-
cost increase. A game is superadditive if, the aggregate payoff of the coalition,
wC(k), is at least equal to the aggregate payoff, when a player i defeats, plus the
payoff of the defector: wC(k) ≥ wC(k\i) + wi(k\i). It’s possible to show that
our game is always superadditive. A game that is both superadditive and with
positive externalities is a fully cohesive game, that means that the aggregate
payoff of the coalition is an increasing function of the size.
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4 Stability
To establish the number of players of a stable IEA we refer to notions of internal
and external stability (see [9]). We want to highlight that these conditions are
more stringent and there are different papers that try to propose different ways
to face the problem (see [12]; [10]). The basic idea is that a coalition is stable
if no one inside has an incentive to defect and no one outside has an incentive
to join in. So, called w the pay-off of a player, a coalition of k players is stable
if the following inequalities:
wCi (k) ≥ wNCi (k − 1), wNCj (k) ≥ wCj (k + 1),
are satisfied, where i is a cooperator and j is a defector. First condition is
called internal stability, while the second one is called external stability.
Substituting optimal emissions into the welfare functions, we can make explicit
the stability conditions. So, consider first the internal stability condition, that
is given by the inequality wCi (k) − wNCi (k − 1) ≥ 0. So, simplifying and
rearranging, we have
wCi (k)− wNCi (k − 1) =−
1
2δi
[( k∑
h=1
βh
)2
− β2i
]
+ βi
[
1
δi
k∑
h=1
h6=i
βj + βi
k∑
h=1
h6=i
1
δh
]
+
+
k∑
h=1
sh ≥ 0,
which becomes
wCi (k)− wNCi (k − 1) = −
1
2δi
(
k∑
h=1
h6=i
βh
)2
+ β2i
(
k∑
h=1
h6=i
1
δh
)
+
k∑
h=1
sh ≥ 0. (5)
We now consider the external stability condition, that gives a number k
such that the inequality wNCj (k)−wCj (k+1) ≥ 0 holds for each player j outside
coalition.
After some algebra, we obtain
wNCj (k)− wCj (k + 1) =
1
2δj
[( k∑
h=1
βh
)2
+ 2βj
k∑
h=1
βh
]
+
− βj
[
βj
k∑
h=1
1
δh
+
1
δj
k∑
h=1
βh
]
−
k∑
h=1
sh − sj ≥ 0,
which becomes
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wNCj (k)− wCj (k + 1) =
1
2δj
(
k∑
h=1
βh
)2
− β2j
(
k∑
h=1
1
δh
)
−
k∑
h=1
sh − sj ≥ 0. (6)
We can observe immediately that the Social Externalities facilitates the
stability of a grand coalition. If we consider the effects of the externalities on
the stability conditions we observe that it helps to obtain internal stability,
but, on the other side, it has a negative effect on external stability. In others
words, if the externality is large enough, we can have that every coalition is
internal stable, while there is no size k for which we have external stability. So,
players have an incentive to join in the coalition. Suppose now that there exist
two kinds of player, developed countries, identified by subscript 1, and devel-
oping countries, denoted by 2. We assume that within each subgroup players
are homogeneous, and that the coalition is arranged by n1 players of kind 1
and n2 of kind 2, with n1 and n2 positive integers such that n1 + n2 ≤ N . So,
we are assuming that within each group, all players have the same parameters:
for countries of kind 1 we have (α1, δ1, β1, s1), while for countries of kind 2 we
have (α2, δ2, β2, s2).
We must specify the stability conditions for developed countries and for devel-
oping ones. So, every condition generates two different inequalities.
For internal stability, we have the two inequalities
wC1 (k)− wNC1 (k − 1) =−
1
2δ1
(
(n1 − 1)β1 + n2β2
)2
+
+ β21
(
n1 − 1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+ s1n1 + s2n2 ≥ 0; (7a)
wC2 (k)− wNC2 (k − 1) =−
1
2δ2
(
n1β1 + (n2 − 1)β2
)2
+
+ β22
(
n1
δ1
+
n2 − 1
δ2
)
+ s1n1 + s2n2 ≥ 0, (7b)
while for external stability the conditions are
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wNC1 (k)− wC1 (k + 1) =
1
2δ1
(
n1β1 + n2β2
)2
− β21
(
n1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+
− s1(n1 + 1)− s2n2 ≥ 0; (8a)
wNC2 (k)− wC2 (k + 1) =
1
2δ2
(
n1β1 + n2β2
)2
− β22
(
n1
δ1
+
n2
δ2
)
+
− s1n1 − s2(n2 + 1) ≥ 0. (8b)
4.1 Existence of a Stable Coalition
At this point, we face two questions: whether the system of inequalities (7a),
(7b), (8a) and (8b) admits solutions and, if yes, what these solutions are.
Unfortunately, it is not analytically tractable in general.
So, in the following we proceed by two steps. First, under suitable assumptions
on the parameters we are able to proof that a solution exists. After that,
removing the above assumptions on the parameters, we make some numerical
simulations to estimate the size and the composition of a stable coalition.
Then, we assume that the vector of coefficients (βN , δS, sN) is proportional to
(βS, δN , sS) according to a natural number σ ∈ N assumed greater than 1.
Then, there exists σ ∈ N , σ > 1 such that
βN
βS
=
δS
δN
=
sN
sS
= σ.
We remark that the case σ = 1 is not realistic because of the difference in
technological advancement of the developed countries.
Thus, if σ is greater than one, we have that β1 > β2, δ2 > δ1 and s1 > s2. The
idea behind is that developed countries are more sensitive to environmental
damages, and then suffer higher marginal costs. Moreover, this sensitiveness
is reflected also on the marginal shift parameters in the production function,
that is smaller compared to the one of developing countries. It is natural to
assume that developed countries are more prone to join in coalition. We want
to highlight that the implication δ1 < δ2 doesn’t mean that countries of kind
2 have an higher production function, because of the presence of parameters
α1 and α2.
Given these assumptions on parameters, after some rearrangements we can
rewrite the system as
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
−y2 + 2(2σ + t)y − 3σ2 ≥ 0,
−y2 + 2(2 + tσ)y − 3 ≥ 0,
y2 − 2(t+ σ)y − 2tσ ≥ 0,
y2 − 2(1 + tσ)y − 2tσ ≥ 0,
(9)
where y = σn1 + n2 and by the proportionality assumption t = σ
δ1s1
β21
. The
above system has not always solutions as in the following example.
Example 4.1 Suppose in a global emission game that β1 = 2, δ1 = 4, s1 = 2
and σ = 2; then t = 4 and system (9) consists in the following three conditions
−y2 + 16y − 12 ≥ 0, −y2 + 20y − 3 ≥ 0, y2 − 18y − 16 ≥ 0,
which are not compatible and in this case there exists no a stable coalition.
We suggest to find a suitable value of s1 (then of s2) in order to ensure a stable
coalition. More precisely we prove the following result.
Proposition 4.2 (Existence of a stable coalition) Let us assume that
s1 =
β21
σδ1
. Then there exists a natural number y¯ ∈ [1+σ+r, 2+σ+r] satisfying
system (9), where r =
√
1 + 4σ + σ2.
Proof 4.3 By considering the assumed value s1 =
β21
σδ1
, we have t = 1 and
system (9) becomes: 
−y2 + 2(2σ + 1)y − 3σ2 ≥ 0,
−y2 + 2(2 + σ)y − 3 ≥ 0,
y2 − 2(1 + σ)y − 2σ ≥ 0.
The first equation is satisfied in the interval
[2σ + 1−
√
(2σ + 1)2 − 3σ2, 2σ + 1 +
√
(2σ + 1)2 − 3σ2] =
[2σ + 1− r, 2σ + 1 + r].
The second equation is satisfied in the interval
[2 + σ −
√
(2 + σ)2 − 3, 2 + σ +
√
(2 + σ)2 − 3] =
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[2 + σ − r, 2 + σ + r]
and the last one in
]−∞, 1 + σ −
√
(1 + σ)2 + 2σ] ∪ [1 + σ +
√
(1 + σ)2 + 2σ,+∞[=
]−∞, 1 + σ − r] ∪ [1 + σ + r,+∞[
where 1 + σ − r < 0, and for σ ≥ 1 we have
2 + σ − r ≤ 2σ + 1− r ≤ 1 + σ + r ≤ 2 + σ + r ≤ 2σ + 1 + r.
In fact, 2σ + 1 − r ≤ 1 + σ + r implies σ ≤ 2r = 2√1 + 4σ + σ2, i.e.
3σ2+16σ+4 ≥ 0 that is true for σ ≥ 1, the rest of inequalities being immediate.
Remark 4.4 In order to have y¯ ∈ [1, N ] we have the following bound on
σ: clearly 1 + σ + r > 1, and solving 2 + σ + r ≤ N we have σ ≤ N2−4N+3
2N
.
Since we assume σ > 1, Proposition 4.2 is significant for N ≥ 8, namely our
analysis works for at least 8 countries world.
Example 4.5 Suppose in a global emission game that β1 = 2, δ1 = 4 and
σ = 2; then we find s1 = 0.5 that ensures a stable coalition with size y¯ ∈
[6.6, 8.6], namely y¯ = 7. Since 2n1 + n2 = 7, it is possible to have a stable
coalition if we have one of the following four possible combinations: n1 = 0
and n2 = 7, n1 = 1 and n2 = 5, n1 = 2 and n2 = 3 or n1 = 3 and n2 = 1.
4.2 Simulations
We have shown that, under some assumptions on the parameters, a solution
exists, but we did no discuss about the size and the composition of a stable
coalition. In order to make more considerations, we present in the following
some numerical simulations, in which the assumption of proportionality is re-
moved. First, let us recall a result from [23], where in the same framework, the
authors found that without externalities the maximal size of a stable coalition
can be achieved with all developing countries, but only with two developed
countries, if β1
β2
is large enough and δ1
δ2
is small enough.
So, we need first to calibrate the parameters and then we have to choose val-
ues which respect the constraint ei > 0 for each i ∈ I. So, for i = {1, 2}, we
take αi ∈ [5, 10], δi ∈ [0.05, 0.3], βi ∈ [0.02, 0.2]. Moreover, we assume that
si ∈ [0.02, 0.2] and that we have 10 countries, with n1 ∈ [0, 6] and n2 ∈ [0, 4],
where clearly n1 and n2 are both natural numbers. This partition is based on
World Bank classification of high income countries and upper-middle income
countries, which are the two sets within that we have all developed countries
and all developing countries that contribute significantly to global pollution.
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Figure 1: Internal stability for developed countries as function of s1 and s2,
with n1 = 6 and n2 = 4
All simulations are made with software Wolfram Mathematica. The next step
is to set parameters for a benchmark model. So, we take
δ1 = 0.15, δ2 = 0.2, β1 = 0.07, β2 = 0.04.
From now on, we evaluate the 32 possible coalitions given by the combinations
of n1 and n2, in term of the internal and external stability conditions. The
first simulations are made for a model without Social Externalites, so we take
s1 = s2 = 0.
In this case we have that the only couples (n1, n2) that solve the stability
conditions are (3, 0), (0, 2), (0, 3). So we can have only small and homogeous
coalitions.
We now introduce the Social Externalities, taking s1 = 0.1 and s2 = 0.06.
For this choice of parameters we verify that while the internal stability is always
verified, the external one it never. That means that each player in coalition
has no incentive to defeat and that each player outside has an incentive to join
in. The final result is that the only stable coalition is the Grand Coalition.
We also want to see how the Social Externalities can be decisive to have a
stable coalition of all players. In figure 1 and 2 we show the internal stability
conditions, for developed and developing countries respectively, as functions of
parameters s1 and s2. What emerges is that the Grand Coalition is unstable
when we have no Social Externalities or when at least one of the two parameters
converges to zero. The same kind of simulations on smaller coalition brings to
similar results, at least from a qualitative point of view2.
The next step is to make some sensitivity analysis on parameters βi and δi,
i = 1, 2.
2Clearly in this cases we have to consider the external stability also, but the results are
specular to the internal stability conditions.
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Figure 2: Internal stability for developing countries as function of s1 and s2,
with n1 = 6 and n2 = 4
To study the effect of an increment of marginal damage, we first set β1 = 0.14.
In this case we have that internal stability is verified only when n1 ≤ 3, but for
these coalitions we don’t have external stability. So, it’s impossible to sign an
agreement. Similar, when we double the value of β2, taking it equal to 0.08,
we have that for developed countries the only stable coalition is (2, 4), but we
don’t have the external stability for developing countries. So, once again, there
is not a stable coalition.
Regarding the parameters δ1 and δ2, from our simulations it results that an
increment of this value does not change the fact that the only stable coalition
is the Grand Coalition. Instead, if we set δ1 = 0.075, we found that we have a
unique solution given by (n1, n2) = (6, 0). On the other side, if we set δ2 = 0.1,
we have again no solution for stability conditions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigated an N -player static game, in which we assumed
asymmetric countries. The aim of this work was to verify whether a Social
Externalities could bring to a Grand Coalition in a more realistic framework
than the one of Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani [6].
So, we first solved the emission game assuming that a positive function, de-
pending on the number of cooperators only, affects the welfares of the players
in coalition. In this framework, we characterized the optimal solutions assum-
ing that we have N asymmetric players.
After that, we considered the stability conditions for a self-enforcing agree-
ment, developed in [9]. In this case, we assumed that players are divided into
two homogenous groups, developed and developing countries. We were able to
proof that a stable coalition exists, making some assumption about parame-
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ters’ relations. We showed that the effect of the externalities on the stability is
to bring to a grand coalition. In fact, we can see from the stability conditions
that the Social Externalities helps to make the internal condition positive, but
makes the external condition unstable. In order to discuss about the size and
the composition of a stable coalition, we made some numerical simulations
that we show in subsection 4.2. We saw that the introduction of the Social
Externalities in our benchmark model brings to an agreement signed by all
players. Finally we make some sensitivity analysis in which we showed that
a change of conditions could have a negative effect, that is greater than the
positive one given by Social Externalities, bringing the Grand Coalition to be
unstable.
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